Subjects learned to classify perceptual stimuli varying along continuous, separable dimensions into rule-described categories. The categories were designed to contrast the predictions of a selective-attention exemplar model and a simple rule-based model formalizing an economy-ofdescription view. Converging evidence about categorization strategies was obtained by also collecting identification and recognition data and by manipulating strategies via instructions. In free-strategy conditions, the exemplar model generally provided an accurate quantitative account of identification, categorization, and recognition performance, and it allowed for the interrelationship of these paradigms within a unified framework. Analyses of individual subject data also provided some evidence for the use of rules, but in general, the rules seemed to have a great deal in common with exemplar storage processes. Classification and recognition performance for subjects given explicit instructions to use specific rules contrasted dramatically with performance in the free-strategy conditions and could not be predicted by the exemplar model.
Markedly different theoretical approaches have been applied to account for the learning and representation of welldefined categories structured according to simple rules and more natural, ill-defined categories (Rosch, 1973 ; E. E. . In the case of well-defined categories, it is generally assumed that people formulate and test hypotheses concerning the "rules" that determine category membership (e.g., Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Levine, 1975; Restle, 1962; Trabasso & Bower, 1968) . By contrast, for ill-defined categories, a central theoretical construct involves the similarity of stimuli to some underlying category representation, whether it be a prototype (Franks & Bransford, 197 l; Homa & Chambliss, 1975; Posner & Keele, 1968; Reed, 1972) , individual exemplars (Brooks, 1978; Hintzman, 1986; Medin & Schaffer, 1978) , or feature-set tabulations (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1977; Neumann, 1974; Reitman & Bower, 1973) .
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Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Robert M. Nosofsky, Department of Psychology, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47405. 282 represent categories by storing individual exemplars in memory. Classification decisions are based on the similarity of stimuli to the stored exemplars. Although originally developed with ill-defined category structures in mind, an intriguing aspect of the model is that it also appears to be applicable to well-defined categories describable by simple rules (Medin, 1986; Nosofsky, 1984 Nosofsky, , 1986 Nosofsky, , 1987 . This theme of attempting to account for rule-describable performance in terms of models that posit more elementary, primitive units can also be seen in recent distributed-memory and connectionist approaches to category representation (e.g., Gluck & Bower, 1988; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985) .
A cornerstone of the context model that facilitates its application to rule-described structures is the assumption that similarities among exemplars are modifiable by selective attention. In the generalized context model (GCM; Nosofsky, 1986) , selective attention is represented in terms of stretching and shrinking of distances in psychological space (Carroll & Wish, 1974) . To illustrate, consider the category structure in Figure 1A , composed of stimuli varying along the dimensions of angle and size. Locations labeled with a 1 represent Category 1 training exemplars, and likewise for Category 2. A salient rule for describing the structure is that stimuli with low angles are assigned to Category l, and stimuli with high angles are assigned to Category 2. According to this rule, transfer stimulus T (see diagram) should be classified in Category 1. An exemplar model predicts the opposite, because T is highly similar to a Category 2 training exemplar. However, if subjects attended selectively to the relevant angle dimension, the psychological space would be distorted as in Figure lB . Distances are "stretched" along the attended angle dimension and are "shrunk" along the unattended size dimension. Transfer stimulus T now becomes more similar to the Category 1 exemplars, allowing the exemplar model to predict the rule-described behavior.
The example in Figure 1 is merely illustrative. We reemphasize that in previous research, the GCM has provided precise quantitative accounts of classification using a variety of rule-described structures, and we refer the reader to this earlier work (Nosofsky, 1984 (Nosofsky, , 1986 (Nosofsky, , 1987 .
Contrasts Between Rules and Exemplars
Our central goal in the present research was to test more rigorously the extent to which classification performance using rule-described structures can be interpreted in terms of the principles of exemplar-based generalization. Although the context model was promising in its previous tests, the classification patterns described by it could be equally well described in terms of simple rules. Our aim in the present research was to develop contrasts between rules and exemplars. We took two approaches to accomplishing this goal. The first was to design category structures for which the context model and an explicitly formalized rule-based model would yield qualitatively different predictions of classification. The second was to obtain converging evidence bearing on the nature of people's mental representations of rule-described categories. In particular, we collected recognition memory data after the completion of classification learning, and also we manipulated classification-learning instructions. 
Diagnostic Category Structure
To contrast the selective-attention exemplar model with rule-based ones, we must specify formally what we mean by a "rule." In its most general sense, a rule can be essentially anything, and it becomes an unfalsifiable construct. Indeed, classifying objects according to their similarity to exemplars constitutes a kind of rule. We believe, however, that classification researchers usually have something more specific in mind when they use the term, although there is seldom an effort to pin it down.
Intuitively, rules seem to correspond to simple verbal descriptions of category membership, for example, "small things belong in Category I." Now, the stimuli used in our experiments vary along continuous dimensions, such as illustrated in Figure 1 . One way of formalizing the notion of a rule in this context is in terms of an extended version of the settheoretic logic (cf. Hunt, 1962; Shepard, Hovland, & Jenkins, 1961; Suppes, 1957) . In addition to the logical operators "and" (A), "or" (v), and "not" (-), we use >, _, <, and _<. The basic elements in the system are the levels on the component dimensions. We denote levels on Dimension 1 with a single prime and levels on Dimension 2 with a double prime. We then formalize the notion that a rule is a simple verbal description by assuming that subjects will adopt the category partitions that require the shortest sequences of logical elements and operators. For example, we expect that in the angle categorization (Figure 1 ), subjects would adopt the Category 1 (Cl) partition C1: ___2', rather than, for example, the more complex partition C 1: 1' v (2' A_<2").
This formalization of rules in terms of shortest set-theoretic string is consistent with a vast research literature concerned with concept learning and perception. For example, Shepard et al. (1961) and Neisser and Weene (1962) suggested and provided evidence for the idea that the difficulty of learning different classification problems is directly related to the length of the shortest set-theoretic string required to describe a category partitioning. Likewise, Restle (1979; see also Leeuwenberg, 1971) proposed and found support for a coding theory for the perception of ambiguous motion configurations. It was assumed that the particular configuration that would be perceived was the one with the most economical information load defined in terms of number of operations required to represent the pattern.
Obviously, there are alternative ways of formalizing the notion of a rule in the present context. The crucial point is that some explicit statement is needed if the construct of a rule is to have any predictive power. Here, we start by testing one possible formalization, although we recognize that it is a highly constrained member of the entire class of rule-based models. Nevertheless, given its extensive research history, the shortest set-theoretic string approach serves as a useful starting candidate to guide our research and to generate challenges for the exemplar model.
The first category structure we designed for discriminating between the simple rule-based model and the selective-attention exemplar model is shown in Figure 2A . We refer to this structure as the "interior-exterior" categorization. Stimuli enclosed by circles are Category 1 training exemplars, stimuli enclosed by triangles are Category 2 training exemplars, and unenclosed stimuli are transfer items. The psychological structure and spacings shown in Figure 2A were determined in preliminary scaling work (see Experiment 1, Method section). The shortest set-theoretic descriptions available for Category 2 are C2: l'vl"v4' and C2: l"v4"v4'. The shortest settheoretic description available for Category 1 is CI: 2' v3". We hypothesize that with learning, subjects will come to adopt one of these rules for describing a category, while defining the other category by default. To be explicit, we will refer to these derived rules as simple rules.
What is critical about the interior-exterior structure is that if any of the simple rules dominated subjects' behavior, the pattern of classification transfer data could not be predicted by the exemplar model. Note first that all of the simple rules (and any mixture of them) predict that Transfer Stimulus 16 will be classified in Category 2. By contrast, without selective attention operating, the exemplar model predicts that Transfer Stimulus 16 will be classified in Category 1 because it is highly similar to Training Exemplar 11. Thus, Transfer Stimulus 16 serves as a marker for discriminating between the rule-based models and an "overall similarity" exemplar model. If subjects attended selectively to angle, the exemplar model would predict a high Category 2 response probability for Stimulus 16 because it becomes highly similar to Training Exemplar 8 (see Figure 2B ). However, now the exemplar model predicts a high Category 1 response probability for Transfer Stimulus 2, which contrasts, for example, with the prediction of the U-shaped rule, C2: l'v l"V4' (see Figure  2B ). Analogous constraints exist for each of the other simple rules and possible patterns of selective attention. Thus, the interior-exterior structure distinguishes the predictions of the simple rule-based models and the exemplar model, even with selective attention operating.
Our primary motivation for using the interior-exterior categorization was its diagnosticity and our judgment that it provided a severe challenge to the selective-attention exemplar model. However, the structure has an additional virtue. Suppose that subjects do adopt rules, but perhaps not the simple ones that we hypothesized a priori. The interior-exterior category admits of a wide variety of more complex rule-based descriptions. Thus, from a broader perspective our study may be considered exploratory, in the sense that we can learn about the kinds of rules that people tend to adopt when inducing classifications. Medin, Wattenmaker, and Michalski (1987) recently conducted such an exploration using discretefeature stimuli. Our study may be viewed as complementing theirs by looking at rule induction in a continuous-dimension stimulus domain.
Categorization, Identification, and Recognition
Our second approach to contrasting rules and exemplars was to gain converging evidence about category-learning strategies by collecting data in other paradigms. As in previous research (Nosofsky, 1986 (Nosofsky, , 1987 Shepard & Chang, 1963; Shepard et al., 1961) , we tested subjects in a complete-identification paradigm in which they were required to identify, with a unique response, each item in the stimulus set. By studying the structure of the interitem errors, information was provided about similarity relations among the category exemplars.
We also collected "old-new" recognition memory data (cf. Estes, 1986b; Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1977; Metcalfe & Fisher, 1986; Omohundro, 198t) . Following initial classification training, subjects were tested in a transfer phase in which they made both categorization and recognition judgments. Generally speaking, if people have stored exemplars in memory, and have attended to all component dimensions, then one might expect better-than-chance recognition performance. By contrast, if subjects stored only a rule, it is unclear exactly how they could distinguish between old and new exemplars. Of course, mixed models are also possible, which assume rule induction together with some form of residual exemplar storage.
Beyond the qualitative question of overall recognition performance, we were interested in making quantitative predictions of recognition for individual stimuli. One idea that has received some support is that recognition judgments may be based on the summed similarity of a probe to all exemplars stored in memory (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Hintzman, 1986; Medin, 1986; Nosofsky, 1988a) . This summed similarity gives a measure of overall familiarity, with higher familiarity values leading to higher recognition probabilities. Note that it is logically possible, according to the summed-similarity model, for ce~ain new exemplars to have high recognition probabilities, as long as they are highly similar to some of the old exemplars. The critical prediction is that one should observe a structured pattern of recognition judgments, with items that are highly similar to the old exemplars having higher recognition probabilities.
To gain additional information about people's recognition capabilities for the present continuous-dimension stimuli, performance was tested for three groups of subjects. Group C was given categorization instructions during training and was then given an unexpected recognition test during transfer. Group C/R was given instructions prior to category training that their recognition performance would also be tested. And Group PI/R, also given prior recognition instructions, was tested in a partial-identification paradigm (see the Method section). In this condition, rather than categorizing, subjects learned unique identification labels for the subset of training exemplars. The partial-identification task seems ideal for fostering recognition performance because it motivates subjects to store the old training exemplars in memory. Thus, it serves as a useful baseline condition for comparison with performance in the categorization conditions.
Our plan is to compare recognition performance among the three groups of subjects and to study relations among identification, categorization, and recognition. The theoretical goal is to achieve a unified quantitative account of the complete-identification, partial-identification, recognition, and categorization data.
Experiment 1

Method Subjects
Subjects were 342 undergraduates at Indiana University who participated as an introductory psychology course requirement. There were 45, 100, 96, and 10! subjects in the complete-identification, partial-identification, and categorization conditions (Groups C and C/R), respectively. Subjects were tested individually or in pairs.
Procedure
In all conditions, stimuli were presented using unlimited (responseterminated) exposure durations. The complete-identification condition was tested for a single block of 150 trials. The categorization and partial-identification conditions were tested for one block of 300 training trials and one block of 80 transfer trials. There was a short break between training and transfer during which subjects read instructions.
Complete identification. On any given trial, one of the 16 stimuli was selected randomly, and the subject identified its size and angle.
The size and angle dimensions were each given the labels 1 (smallest size, lowest angle) through 4 (largest size, highest angle). Subjects entered responses by pressing one of four buttons arranged in a row. To enter size i and angle j, the subject first pressed button i and then pressed button j. Following the responses, corrective feedback was provided.
Categorization. In the training phase, subjects learned to classify assigned exemplars into Category 1 or 2. Stimulus presentations were random, and trial-by-trial feedback was provided. Subjects in Group C/R were given prior instructions about subsequent recognition testing; subjects in Group C were not. Following training, both groups were tested in transfer phase in which old and new exemplars were presented. On each trial, a subject first judged whether the exemplar was old or new and then made a categorization decision. Corrective feedback was presented for both recognition and categorization. Feedback for categorization was not provided on trials in which new exemplars were presented because there were no correct answers on these trials. During the transfer phase, the stimuli were presented in five blocks of trials. There was one presentation of each stimulus during each block. Order of presentation was randomized within blocks. Subjects were instructed to judge as new any exemplar that had not been presented during the training phase, even those new exemplars that were repeated during transfer.
Partial identification. The same seven training exemplars were used in partial identification as in categorization. Each exemplar was assigned a unique label (the letters H, J, K, M, R, S, I40, randomly assigned for each subject. All subjects received prior instructions that old-new recognition would be tested. The procedures for training and transfer in partial identification were the same as for categorization, except that subjects identified stimuli as unique items rather than classifying them into groups. During transfer, subjects were instructed that even if they judged an exemplar to be new, they should still give its most likely identification response, because their recognition judgment might be in error.
Apparatus
Stimuli were circles varying orthogonally in size (four levels) and angle of orientation of a radial line (four levels). The four sizes (length of radius) were 4. 94, 6.17, 8.81, and 10 .05 mm; the four angles were 25", 50", 130", and 155". These values of size and angle were chosen so that all levels would be fairly discriminable and so that Levels 2 and 3 would be highly discriminable (see the psychological scaling solution in Figure 2A ). Such a structure allowed us to distinguish more clearly between the predictions of the simple-rule and exemplar models.
Two VRI4 scopes, interfaced with a PDP-11/34 computer, were used to present the stimuli. All stimuli were of equal luminance and appeared as continuous green figures on a black background. Subjects sat approximately 2 ft from the scopes in a normally lit room and entered responses using response boxes that were interfaced with the computer.
Results
Overall recognition performance was measured by calculating the probability of a "hit" minus the probability of a "false alarm" for each subject in each block. The averaged data are presented in Table 1 . Recognition performance differed significantly among the groups, F(2, 294) = 19.2, p < .001, MSe =. 118. Although overall performance was poor, it was significantly better than chance, F(I, 294) = 62.5, p < .0001. Newman-Keuls tests revealed that recognition performance in the partial-identification condition was significantly better than in the categorization conditions, but the two categorization conditions did not differ. Recognition performance in the categorization conditions taken by themselves was also significantly better than chance, F(1, 195) --10.9, p < .005. Performance did not change significantly over .00 Rule-instructions (Group 2)
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blocks, and there was no Condition x Blocks interaction (Fs< 1).
In model-based analyses presented subsequently, we focus on the transfer data obtained only for subjects who met learning criteria during the training phase. In the categorization conditions, learners are defined as subjects who classified each category exemplar with greater than 50% accuracy during the final 150 trials of training. In the partial-identification condition, learners are defined as subjects who averaged above 75% correct (pooled over all exemplars) during the final 150 trials. ~ In Conditions C, C/R, and PI/R, 53, 69, and 84 subjects, respectively, met these criteria. The recognition data for the learners are presented in Table 1 . The pattern of data is identical to that obtained for the full set of subjects, and analyses of variance yielded the same results. Figure 3 shows the probability with which each stimulus was judged as old by the the learners during the recognition transfer tests. The pattern of data in the categorization and partial-identification conditions was similar, with a correlation of .79 between the two data sets (p < .001). False-alarm rates were lowest for new Exemplars 12 and 16, which were located in the most isolated portion of the stimulus space relative to the old training exemplars (see Figure 2) .
The finding of better-than-chance recognition performance suggests that something more than just a rule was stored in memory during category learning. The finding that the pattern of recognition data was similar for the categorization and partial-identification conditions is consistent with the exemplar model, as is the finding that the most easily discriminated new exemplars were those least similar to the old exemplars. We return to these data in the theoretical analyses section and discuss possible reasons why recognition performance in the partial-identification condition was better than in the categorization conditions. together with residual exemplar storage. We explore this issue by studying the structure of the identification and categorization confusion data.
Summary of the GCM
Our analyses of the identification and categorization data are conducted within the unified framework provided by the multidimensional scaling (MDS) choice model (Nosofsky, 1985; Shepard, 1957) and the GCM (Nosofsky, 1986) . Because the framework has been discussed extensively in previous work, we only summarize it here.
According to the GCM, the strength of making a category J response given presentation of stimulus i is found by summing the similarity of stimulus i to the complete set of presented exemplars of category J (Estes, 1986a; Nosofsky, 1988b) , and then multiplying this summed similarity by the response bias for category J. This strength is then divided by the sum of strengths for all categories to determine the category J response probability. Thus, in the present two-category experiment, the probability that stimulus i is classified in ,
where b~ (0 <_ b, _< 1) is the Category 1 response bias, and where sij denotes the similarity between exemplars i and j. In the special case in which each stimulus defines its own category, the response rule in the GCM reduces to the classic similarity choice model for predicting identification confusion data (Luce, 1963; Shepard, 1957 ; J. E. K. Smith, 1980; Townsend & Landon, 1982) . The probability that stimulus i is identified as stimulus j is given by bj s,j P(Rj I S~) = y, bk sik"
k The relation between Equations 1 and 2 is one of the keys to predicting categorization from identification. A critical problem, however, is that because of selective attention strategies, the s~j similarity values in Equations 1 and 2 may not be invariant. As discussed previously, the selective-attention assumption is a cornerstone of the context model, and it is one of the factors that facilitates the context model's application to rule~escribed structures. To characterize attention-based changes in similarity relations, a theory of similarity is needed. For the continuous-
Theoretical Analyses
Although the results for old-new recognition support the idea that at least some exemplar storage took place during category learning, we have yet to consider whether similarity comparisons to these stored exemplars formed the basis for categorization decisions. For example, rule induction could have formed the basis for classification, even if it occurred ~A central goal in this research was to achieve accurate quantitative predictions of classification and recognition performance. A number of unwanted noise factors could contribute to poor performance, including lack of motivation, failure to understand instructions, equipment malfunctions, and so forth. Such factors would make it difficult for any model to accurately predict performance. The performance criteria were chosen by inspecting overall error distributions over the subjects and searching for natural breakpoints. All criteria were selected prior to actual model analyses. Figure 3 . Probability with which each stimulus was recognized as old in the categorization and partialidentification transfer phases.
dimension stimuli used in these experiments, it is natural to apply the MDS approach. Each exemplar is represented as a point in a two-dimensional space, with the similarity between exemplars being some decreasing function of their distance in the space. Specifically, for the separable-dimension stimuli being used in these experiments (Garner, 1974; Shepard, 1964) , the distance between exemplars i and j is given by a weighted city-block metric:
where x~m is the psychological value of exemplar i on dimension m. The parameter w~ (0 _< w~ _< 1) is the attention weight given to Dimension 1 (angle) in computing psychological distance. The geometric interpretation of the attention weights is that of stretching and shrinking of the psychological space along its coordinate axes ( Figure 1B ). The distance d,j is converted to a similarity measure using an exponential decay function:
which appears to describe accurately the relation between similarity and psychological distance in classification-learning situations involving fairly discriminable stimuli (Shepard, 1958 (Shepard, , 1986 (Shepard, , 1987 . The parameter c (0 _< c < oo) in Equation 4 is a sensitivity parameter reflecting overall discriminability in the psychological space. The approach to predicting categorization from identification can now be outlined. The identification data are analyzed using the similarity choice model (Equation 2), with the assumption that the s~j similarity values are functionally related to distances in a two-dimensional space (Equations 3 and 4). By fitting this MDS-choice model to the identification data, an MDS solution is derived for the stimulus set. This MDS solution is then used in conjunction with the GCM (Equations 1, 3, and 4) to predict performance in any given categorization condition using the same set of stimuli. Because an MDS solution has already been derived (the Xim coordinates in Equation 3), we need estimate only the sensitivity parameter c, attention weight w~, and response bias parameter bj to predict categorization performance.
Complete Identification
The confusion data obtained during Trials 51 through 150 of the complete-identification condition are presented in Appendix A. (We analyze the data of 36 of the 45 tested subjects who met a performance criterion of 75% correct overall identifications.) Because the stimuli were readily discriminable, subjects made relatively few identification errors. The MDS-choice model was fitted to the confusion data using a maximum likelihood criterion. 2 For simplicity in the analyses, and because the confusion matrix was sparse, we assumed a "constrained" multidimensional space in which all stimuli sharing a common physical value of angle had the same psychological value on the angle dimension, and likewise for the size dimension. This assumption greatly reduces the number of parameters one needs to estimate. Whereas an "unconstrained" two-dimensional solution used 32 parameters (two coordinates for each of the 16 stimuli), the "constrained" solution uses only 8 parameters (the four psychological values of size and angle). Furthermore, because distances are invariant under vertical and horizontal translations of the space, the lowest levels of angle and size are set arbitrarily equal to 2A computer search was used to find the parameters that maximized the log-likelihood function lnL=~ In N~.t-~ y~ lnfj.t+ ]~ ~fj In p~j,
where N~ is the frequency with which stimulus i was presented, ~ is the observed frequency with which stimulus i was identified as stimulus j, and p~j is the predicted probability with which stimulus i is identified as stimulus j. This likelihood function assumes that responses for each stimulus are multinomially distributed and that the distributions for each stimulus are independent. The same likelihood function is used for fitting the GCM to the categorization matrix, except now f) (p~j) corresponds to the observed frequency (predicted probability) with which stimulus i is classified in category j. Because individual subjects contribute multiple entries to the data matrices, and these entries are probably not independent, the interpretation of the above equation as a "pure" likelihood function should be made with caution.
zero, meaning that there are only 6 free coordinate parameters.
The maximum likelihood constrained MDS-choice model parameters are presented in Appendix A, and the MDS solution is shown in Figure 2A . The MDS-choice model provided a good description of the identification data, accounting for 99.9% of the variance. More important, now that an MDS solution has been derived, we can use the GCM to predict categorization, partial-identification, and recognition performance.
Categorization
The probability with which each stimulus was classified in Category 1 by the learners is shown in Figure 4 . The GCM was fitted to the categorization data using a maximum likelihood criterion. The best fitting parameters and summary fits are reported in Table 2 (Model 1). The predicted categorization probabilities are shown alongside the observed probabilities in Figure 4 . The three-parameter model accounts for 97.9% of the variance in the data. Note that the model performs well despite people's tendency to classify Stimulus 16 in Category 2. As discussed earlier, a tendency to classify Stimulus 16 in Category 2 is inconsistent with the predictions of an overall-similarity (w, =.50) exemplar model. According to the GCM, people weighted differentially the angle dimension in making their classification decisions. This attentionweighting causes Stimulus 16 to become more similar to Exemplar 8 of Category 2, and so it is classified in that category. For comparison, we show in Table 2 (Model 2) the fit of a restricted version of the GCM in which w, = .50. As can be seen, this overall-similarity exemplar model performs dramatically worse than the full model. based models, the overall pattern of categorization data is not consistent with these models. The simple rule C2: l' v 1" v4' fails because Stimulus 2 was classified in Category 1 and Stimulus 7 was classified in Category 2. The simple rule C 1: 2'v 3" fails because Stimuli 9 and 12 were classified in Category 2 and Stimulus 15 was classified in Category 1. And the simple rule C2: l"V 4' v 4" fails for over half the new transfer exemplars. It appears that none of the simple rules dominated subjects' classification behavior. Quantitative fits for the simple rule-based models are provided in Table 2 (Models 3-5). The rule-based models were fitted to the data using an augmented version of the GCM response rule (Equation 1; see Nosofsky, 1986, pp. 46-51) . Instead of computing the summed similarity of a stimulus to all experimenter-assigned category exemplars, one computes the summed similarity of a stimulus to all rule-inferred category exemplars. For example, for the U-shaped rule, C2: l'v l"V4', the strength of a Category 2 response is found by summing the similarity of a stimulus to Exemplars l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13 , and 16 (see Figure 2B ). The rule-based models are given the same flexibility as the context model by allowing the parameters c, w,, and b, to vary freely. This provides a straightforward approach to adding a confusability principle to the rule-based models and, thus, allows for direct quantitative comparisons with the selective-attention exemplar model. A formal rationale for this quantification of the rulebased models is provided in Appendix B. As indicated in Table 2 , each of the simple rule-based models performs considerably worse than the exemplar model, which is not surprising in light of the qualitative comparisons considered earlier.
Inspection of Figure 4 suggests the following post hoc rule for describing the pattern of data: If there is an extreme value of angle (1' or 4'), then the stimulus belongs in Category 2; if the angle level is 2', then the stimulus belongs in Category l; and if the angle level is 3', then the stimulus belongs in Category 1 if it is large (->3") and in Category 2 if it is small (_<2"). We summarize this rule using the notation C2: l'v4'v(3' ^-<2"). As indicated in Table 2 (Model 6), even this post hoc rule fares worse than the exemplar model in terms of quantitative fit.
The intriguing possibility remains that some mixture of the simple rules operated in our experiments. A mixture of rules not only might lead us to incorrectly reject a rule-based approach but, in addition, might lead us to incorrectly support the exemplar model. Indeed, Martin and Caramazza (1980) suggested that the success of the context model may be an artifact of averaging over the responses of subjects using different classification rules.
To explore whether our averaged categorization data might have arisen out of a confluence of different rules, we analyzed the data at the level of individual subjects. Recall that subjects classified each exemplar 5 times during the transfer phase. We computed a classification partition for each subject as follows. Any unassigned transfer exemplar classified 3 times or more into Category 1 was defined as belonging in Category 1; otherwise, it belonged in Category 2. All experimenterassigned training exemplars were defined as belonging in their appropriate category. (Because there were nine unassigned exemplars, there are 2 ~ = 512 unique partitions.) We then tabulated the frequency with which each classification partition was observed. Figure 5 illustrates all partitions that were observed for at least four individuals, and it also shows one partition that was not observed (Partition H). The seven observed partitions were adopted by 76 of the 122 category learners. As explained in Appendix C, the frequency with which the partitions were observed can be compared with the GCM-predicted frequency. It turns out that six of the seven partitions would arise with high probability if people based classification decisions on similarity comparisons with the stored training exemplars. According to the GCM, Partitions A, B, D, and G arise with high probability if people attend selectively to the angle dimension. Partition E is the highest probability partition for cases in which subjects attend equally to the component dimensions, and it also arises with high probability if there is slight selective attention to the angle dimension. And Partition F arises with high probability if subjects weight differentially the size dimension. Assuming the parameters estimated from the averaged data, the GCM also predicts that a large number of low-frequency partitions should arise (i.e., common to less than four individuals), as was observed in out data. In sum, the exemplar model is descriptive of the behavior of many of our individual subjects as well as being descriptive of the averaged data.
A notable shortcoming of the model is that l0 subjects adopted Partition C, which is precisely one of the simple rulebased partitions posited earlier. According to the GCM, this partition should arise with very low probability (see Appendix C). Thus, there is support for the idea that some of the category learners did indeed adopt a simple rule-based strategy rather than a strategy based on exemplar-similarity comparisons. We should also note that the classification patterns for some of the nonlearners seemed consistent with simple rule-based strategies. For example, 12 of the nonlearners correctly classifted all training exemplars except for Stimulus 3, which they classified in Category 1 (see Figure 2 ). This pattern is consistent with the simple (but incorrect) rule that all stimuli with extreme values on the angle dimension belong in Category 2, with intermediate levels of angle signaling Category 1. The pattern of categorization transfer data for this subset of subjects corroborated this interpretation.
Another shortcoming of the exemplar model is that no subjects adopted Partition H. Assuming the parameters estimated from the averaged data, this partition is predicted to arise with moderately high probability (.09 l). An intriguing aspect of Partition H is that Transfer Stimulus 16 is noncontiguous with other Category 2 members. Several factors may militate against the formation of partitions with isolated exemplars. For example, initial decisions during the transfer phase to classify Stimuli 12 and 15 into Category 1 may also have led people to classify Stimulus 16 into Category l, because it is highly similar to Stimuli 12 and 15. There were no other partitions that were predicted to arise with probability greater than .03 that were not actually observed.
Rule Interpretation
A theorist wishing to maintain a rule explanation can argue that the classification partitions shown in Figure 5 can be described by rules--the rules that people adopted were generally more complex than the simple ones we posited earlier.
Without disputing this argument, we reemphasize that if the construct of a rule is to have any predictive power, it is important to specify a priori the kinds of rules that people will adopt. Thus, we believe that the patterns of data shown in Figure 5 will be useful to theorists interested in discovering constraints on rule induction.
In a recent exploration of rule induction in classification, Medin et al. (1987) found that the rules that people adopted generally contained more than the minimum content needed to discriminate between categories. That is, the rules were more specific than was necessary. The same is generally true of the category partitions shown in Figure 5 . For example, the rules describing Partitions A and B, C2: 1' v4' v(3' A 1") and C2: l'v4' V(3'A_2"), could have been simplified using the rule C2: l'V4'v 1".
The partitions shown in Figure 5 are also consistent with Medin et al.'s (1987) hypothesis that people often form rules involving "opportunistic disjunctions." The idea is that people start by finding descriptions of a category that are consistent in the sense that no members of a contrast category satisfy the description. However, consistent descriptions may not cover all members of the target category. For example, in the present interior-exterior structure, the rule C2: 1' v4' is consistent because no members of Category 1 satisfy this description. The rule is incomplete, however, because Stimulus 3 is not covered. Medin et al. suggested that when an initial description fails to cover the entire set, people focus on the remaining exemplars of the category and form an opportunistic disjunction of these exemplars with the initial description. So, for example, the Partition A subjects may have formed the opportunistic disjunction C2: 1' v4' v(y ^ 1"). Of course, to the extent that rules include enumeration of individual exemplars, the exemplar and rule approaches become even more difficult to distinguish. Although our observed classification partitions can certainly be described in terms of rules, we find it striking that at least under the present experimental conditions, these rules have so much in common with the selective-attention exemplar model.
Partial Identification
The confusion data obtained in the partial-identification condition are presented in Appendix A. Because an MDS solution was derived previously from the complete-identification data, we can fit the MDS-choice model to the partialidentification data by estimating only the sensitivity parameter c and attention weight w~. (The bias parameters contributed negligibly to the model fits, and so we report the results for only the two-parameter model.) The maximum likelihood parameter estimates were c = .87 and w, = .46. As expected, subjects attended roughly equally to size and angle in the partial-identification condition. Note that the two-parameter model was used to predict 112 data entries in the matrix, 96 of which were free to vary (see Appendix A). The model accounted for 94.6% of the variance.
Recognition
The recognition data obtained in the categorization and partial-identification conditions (Figure 3 ) are assumed to be related to the overall familarity of each stimulus (F~), measured by summing the similarity of each stimulus to all training exemplars stored in memory:
The similarity between each pair of exemplars was computed using the MDS solution for the stimulus set. We held fixed the sensitivity and attention-weight parameters at those values that provided maximum likelihood fits to the categorization and partial-identification confusion data. Thus, the recognition predictions for each condition are parameter free.
The correlation between the log-transformed summed similarity values and the probability of an old response was .85 in the categorization condition and .83 in the partial-identification condition (p < .001). (A log-transformation was used to linearize the relation.) Scatterplots of the observed recognition probabilities against the log-transformed summed similarity values are shown in Figure 6 . Although there is a good deal of room for improvement, the summed-similarity model appears to capture significant aspects of subjects' recognition judgments. The model predicts correctly that Transfer Stimuli 12 and 16, located in the most isolated portion of the stimulus space, have the lowest recognition probabilities. Interestingly, the difference between summed similarity values for old and new exemplars is greater in the partialidentification condition than in the categorization conditions. One reason is the difference in the value of the attentionweight parameter in the two conditions. Subjects attended roughly equally to the component dimensions in the partialidentification condition (wi = .46), but they attended more to angle than to size in the categorization conditions (w~ = .64). In general, as selective attention to a single dimension increases, ability to discriminate between new and old exemplars gets worse. Thus, the exemplar model itself provides at least a partial explanation as to why recognition performance in the partial-identification condition was better than in the categorization conditions. Of course, if our previous interpretation is correct, namely that some subjects in the categorization conditions did indeed adopt simple rule-based strategies, then there is an additional reason why recognition performance in the categorization conditions was worse than in the partial-identification condition.
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Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we tested two additional groups of subjects using the interior-exterior structure. Now, however, subjects were given explicit instructions to classify items using the simple rules. (One group was instructed to apply the rule C2: 1' v 1" v 4', and a second group, the rule C2:1" v 4' v 4".) One motivation for this follow-up was simply to take extreme measures to falsify the exemplar model; it seemed worthwhile to demonstrate at least certain conditions in which the exemplar model would fail. At the same time, the classification data collected under these extreme conditions could serve to validate our proposed quantification of the rule-based models tested in Experiment 1. Finally, we were interested in exploring the pattern of old-new recognition data that would be obtained under these explicit rule-application conditions. Was the pattern of recognition performance observed in Experiment 1 an automatic byproduct of residual exemplar memories, or was it influenced by the mode of classification learning?
Method Subjects
The subjects were 80 undergraduates from Indiana University who participated for course credit. There were 41 subjects in Group 1 and 39 subjects in Group 2.
Stimuli and Procedure
The stimuli and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1, except that subjects were given explicit instructions to classify items using one of the simple rules. Group 1 subjects were given written instructions corresponding to the rule C2:1 'v l"V4' and Group 2 subjects the rule C2:1" v4' v4".
Results and Theoretical Analysis Classification
As in Experiment 1, our theoretical analyses of the classification data are restricted to learners, that is, those subjects who classified each exemplar with greater than 50% accuracy during the final 150 trials of training. In Groups 1 and 2, 30 and 28 subjects, respectively, met these learning criteria.
The probability with which each stimulus was classified in Category 1 by the learners in Groups 1 and 2 is shown in Table 3 along with the predictions of the exemplar model and the appropriate rule-based model. Maximum likelihood parameters and summary fits are reported in Table 4 . The results stand in marked contrast to those reported in Experiment 1. The exemplar model fails dramatically to account for the patterns of data, whereas the quantitative fits for the rulebased models are impressive. Apparently, subjects were able • to apply the simple rules if instructed to do so; however, given our results from Experiment 1, people did not seem to freely adopt these rules via induction over exemplars. Despite the clear superiority of the rule-based models over the exemplar model under the present conditions, there are shortcomings in the rule-model predictions for Group 2 that are intriguing. The largest discrepancy is for Stimulus 15, and the discrepancies for Stimuli 12 and 16 are also sizable. These three stimuli satisfy the rule for Category 2, but they are highly similar to a Category 1 training exemplar (Stimulus 11). To corroborate this observation, we fitted a mixture model to the Group 2 categorization data. With probability p, classification was assumed to be based on the rule, whereas with probability 1 -17, classification was based on exemplars. The maximum likelihood parameters and summary fits are shown in Table  4 . The mixture model leads to considerable improvement in the theoretical predictions. The best fitting parameter (p = .85) indicates that the overwhelming majority of classification decisions were rule based, but that even in this explicit ruleinstructions condition, there was some exemplar-based responding. To a certain extent, people's application of the rule may have been guided by their experience with the original training exemplars.
Recognition
The overall recognition performance data are shown in Table 1 . As was true of the classification data, the recognition data stand in contrast to those reported in Experiment 1. Performance was not significantly better than chance, with the average hit-minus-false-alarm rates actually being slightly negative.
The probability with which each stimulus was called "old" by the learners is shown separately for Groups 1 and 2 in Table 5 . The patterns of recognition data contrast markedly with those in Experiment 1. There is no longer a relation between summed similarity and recognition probability. The correlations between the recognition data observed in the baseline partial-identification condition of Experiment 1 and the present data sets are .01 for Group 1 and. 12 for Group 2. And Exemplar 16, located in the most isolated portion of the stimulus space, no longer has the lowest recognition probability.
To a first approximation, a fair description of the present recognition data is that subjects were more prone to make an "old" judgment to the extent that the exemplar satisfied the stated rule (particularly in Group 1). In both groups, recognition probabilities associated with Category 2 exemplars were higher than those associated with Category l exemplars. (Recall that in both groups, the rules were stated with respect to membership in Category 2.) For the rule C2: l'vl"V4' (Group 1), recognition probabilities were highest for Exemplars 1 and 4, which were the only two exemplars that jointly satisfied both the size and angle sufficient conditions for category membership. Likewise, for the rule C2: l"v4'v4" (Group 2), recognition probability was highest for Exemplar 4, which also satisfied both the size and angle sufficient conditions. There may have been some memory for old exemplars in Group 2, however, as isolated Stimuli 12, 15, and 16 had slightly deflated recognition probabilities. The mixture of rules and exemplars that appeared to govern Group 2's classification decisions may also have governed their recognition judgments.
Experiment 3
A limitation of the rule-described structures studied in ]3xperiments 1 and 2 is that the rules may have been unnatural; for example, they were entirely disjunctive in character. Furthermore, our assumption that people would adopt a rule for only one category while defining the other category by default is another source of concern. Although this assumption is implicit in the classic concept-learning literature, people may sometimes try to develop rules for both categories. In this case, the simple rules that we posited for the interiorexterior structure would lead to contradictory decisions for some of the transfer items. For example, the rules C 1: 2' v 3" and C2: l'v 1" v4' lead to contradictory decisions for Items 2, 9, 12, and 15. This problem may have biased subjects away from the simple rule strategies.
In Experiment 3, we addressed these concerns by testing subjects using a conjunctive-rule category structure--perhaps the archetypical logical rule studied in concept-learning research (e.g., Bruner et al., 1956 ). The structure is illustrated in Figure 7A . As in our previous experiments, the stimuli given by the conjunctive rule: C 1: >-3'^-<2". Membership in Category 2 is given by the complement: C2: -<2' v_3". These rules are the shortest set-theoretic descriptions available for Categories 1 and 2. The rules are mutually exclusive and exhaustive and, moreover, seem entirely "natural." Two items that help to distinguish the alternative model predictions are Transfer Stimuli 2 and 12. According to the simple rules, these transfer stimuli should be classified in Category 2. By contrast, according to the exemplar model, these transfer stimuli should be classified in Category 1 because they are highly similar to Category 1 Training Exemplars 3 and 8. Because both dimensions are relevant for defining the conjunctive-rule structure, major distortions of the psychological space due to selective attention would not be expected. Furthermore, selective attention to a single dimension would move classification tendencies for Items 2 and 12 in opposite directions. Although the qualitative predictions for Items 2 and 12 will vary with the values of the attention-weight and category-bias parameters, new constraints would be placed on the full matrix of classification confusions that provide sharp contrasts between the quantitative predictions of the rule and exemplar models.
The stimuli used in our previous experiments were circles varying in size and angle of radial line. Although these are generally considered separable-dimension stimuli, they may have certain integral characteristics (Garner & Felfoldy, 1970; L. B. Smith & Kilroy, 1979) . Extreme psychological separability would bolster the plausible use of the set-theoretic rules because their application requires separate processing of each dimension. Therefore, in the present experiment we used stimulus components from two modalities, namely a line varying in length and a tone varying in pitch.
Upon initial consideration of Figure 7A , one might posit a single linear boundary for partitioning the Category l and Category 2 exemplars, as illustrated in Figure 7B . Although such a boundary would be extremely plausible if the stimulus components were homogeneous and easily compared (Ashby & Gott, 1988; Garner, 1978) , it is not obvious that such a boundary would be adopted for the present heterogeneous, highly separable components.
The present experimental design is closely related to one used previously by Ashby and Gott (1988) in an exploration of decision rules used in perceptual classification. These investigators were interested in distinguishing between the predictions of independent-decisions models and informationintegration models (Green & Swets, 1966; Shaw, 1982) . In an independent-decisions model, separate decisions are made about each individual stimulus component, and then these decisions are combined in making a response. For example, in the present design, separate decisions would be made as to whether or not the length component is greater than or equal to 3' and whether or not the pitch component is less than or equal to 2". Only if both decisions were positive would a Category 1 response be made. The rule-based model exemplifies an independent-decisions strategy. By contrast, in an information-integration model, perceptual information from both components would be combined before making a decision. The exemplar model provides one example of an information-integration strategy.
Although Ashby and Gott (1988) have already reported some evidence favoring information-integration strategies, there are some critical aspects of our designs that could lead to different results. In their method, stimuli were generated probabilistically over the entire domain of the two-dimensional space. Samples corresponding to Transfer Stimuli 2 and 12 were likely to have been presented during training, and by use of an information-integration strategy, subjects could increase their proportions of correct classifications. By contrast, in the present design, subjects can in principle achieve 100% accuracy using either an independent-decisions strategy or an information-integration strategy. Transfer stimuli are presented only after the completion of training to discover the nature of the induced rules. A second difference concerns the actual stimuli used to instantiate the presumed dimensional structure of the categories. Ashby and Gott used figures consisting of a vertical and horizontal line joined at a corner (e.g., ~--) and assumed that the psychological dimensions corresponded to the lengths of the lines. It is plausible, however, that a relational dimension may have been primary in this situation, namely the difference (or ratio) in lengths of the lines (Monahan & Lockhead, 1977; Weintraub, 1971) . If so, then the pattern of results reported by Ashby and Gott could be interpreted as being consistent with an independentdecisions model. In summary, there are important differences between our design and the one used by Ashby and Gott that make the present experimental outcome nonobvious.
Method
Except for our use of a different category structure and new stimuli, the procedure paralleled the ones for Experiments 1 and 2. Three conditions were tested: partial identification, rule-instructions categorization, and free-strategy categorization.
Subjects
The subjects were 120 undergraduates from Indiana University who participated for course credit. There were 30 subjects in the partial-identification condition, 30 subjects in the rule-instructions categorization condition, and 60 subjects in the free-strategy categorization condition. The subjects in the free-strategy conditions were divided into two groups, an initial group of 30 subjects and a second group that constituted a direct replication.
Stimuli and Apparatus
The stimuli were composed of two orthogonaUy varying componentsl a line varying in length and a tone varying in pitch. There were four levels of line length: 28, 90, 110, and 180 ram; and four levels of pitch: 100, 1000, 1050, and 2400 Hz. An IBM personal computer was used to present the stimuli and to control the experiment.
Procedure
Except where noted below, the procedure was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. There were 250 training trims in the partialidentification and free-strategy categorization conditions and 150 training trials in the rule-instructions condition. Stimulus presentation probabilities were uniform except during Trials 76 through 175 of partial identification and free-strategy categorization, and Trials 51 through 100 of rule-instructions categorization. During these intermediate trials, Stimulus 7 was presented with probability .406, Stimuli 6 and 11 with probability .219 each, and the remaining stimuli with probability .031 each. The higher probabilities for Stimuli 6, 7, and 11 were used to emphasize the importance of discriminating between Levels 2 and 3 on each dimension (see Figure 7) . Subjects did not receive feedback during the transfer phase and were not given preliminary instructions that recognition performance would be tested. At the end of the experiment, subjects in the free-strategy group gave written reports of their strategies. The following excerpt was the only part of the instructions that distinguished the ruleinstructions group from the free-strategy group:
There is a simple rule for classifying the stimuli. Any stimulus composed of a long line AND a low tone belongs to Category 1. All other stimuli belong to Category 2. The only hard part of the experiment is to learn the boundary that separates long lines from short lines and low tones from high tones.
Results and Theoretical Analysis Partial Identification
The data obtained in the transfer phase of the partialidentification condition are reported in Appendix A. (We analyze the data of 25 of the 30 subjects who met a performance criterion of 70% correct overall identifications on old items.) The MDS solution derived by fitting the MDS-choice model to these data is illustrated in Figure 8 , with the maximum likelihood coordinate and bias parameters reported in Appendix A. The psychological spacings among the stimuli do not correspond precisely with the planned design (cf. Figures 7 and 8 ). As will be seen, however, the category structure is still sufficiently sharp to distinguish the quantitative predictions of the rule and exemplar models. The MDSchoice model accounted for 98.6% of the response variance in the partial-identification confusion matrix.
Rule-Instructions Categorization
The probability with which each stimulus was classified in Category 1 during the transfer phase of the rule-instructions condition is shown in Table 6 , along with the predictions of the rule and exemplar models. Maximum likelihood parameters and summary fits are reported in Table 7 . The rule model provides an impressive fit to the categorization transfer data, and one that is distinctly superior to the fit of the exemplar model. Note that this superior quantitative fit arises despite people's tendency to classify Stimuli 2 and 12 in Category 1. According to the rule model, people had a general bias for making Category 1 responses during transfer (see Table 7 ), which overrides the fact that Stimuli 2 and 12 fail to satisfy the Category 1 rule. (The direction of bias is consistent with Parducci's [1974] findings that people tend to assign the same number of stimulus presentations to available categories.) Fortunately, the full matrix of categorization confusion data contains sufficient constraints to disentangle the quantitative predictions of the contrasting models.
Free-Strategy Categorization
The probability with which each stimulus was classified in Category 1 in the free-strategy condition is shown in Table 8 , separately for Group 1 and replication Group 2. The patterns of data observed for the two groups are very similar (r = .95). Maximum likelihood parameters and summary fits for the rule and exemplar models are reported in Table 7 . The pattern of results is reversed from the rule-instructions condition, with the exemplar model providing a clearly better fit than the rule model. In their written strategy reports, a significant number of subjects admitted to guessing. Thus, we fitted augmented versions of both the rule and exemplar models to the free-strategy data. It was assumed that with probability g, subjects guessed Category I or 2 randomly, whereas with probability (1 -g), classification decisions were based on either the rule or exemplars. As seen in Table 7 , the guessing parameter improved substantially the quantitative fits for both the rule and exemplar models, but with the exemplar model maintaining its advantage for both groups. The predictions of the augmented models are shown along with the observed Category 1 response probabilities in Table 8 . The same modelbased analyses were also conducted using the data of only the top 30 performers across both groups of subjects. Except for a large reduction in the estimated value of the guessing parameter (g = . 19), the results were essentially identical to those reported in Table 7 , with the exemplar model maintaining a sizable advantage over the rule model.
The possibility that some subjects used the conjunctive rule and others the exemplar strategy was examined by fitting a mixture model to the categorization data. It was assumed that with probability p, subjects used the rule, with probability q, they used exemplars, and with probability 1 -p -q, they guessed randomly. The rule-model parameters were held fixed at those values estimated from the rule-instructions condition, where presumably virtually all subjects used the conjunctive rule. This mixture model led to no improvement over the pure exemplar-plus-guessing model, however, with the maximum likelihood estimate of the rule-use parameter p being essentially zero. Finally, in their written reports, some subjects indicated classifying stimuli with short lines and high pitches into Category 1 (see Figure 7) . These reports suggested to us that some subjects may surprisingly have adopted an unnecessarily complex biconditional rule, CI: (_> 3' A _< 2") V (_< 2' A ->3"). However, a model that assumed mixing of the conjunctive rule, biconditional rule, and random guessing still fared considerably .worse than the exemplar-plus-guessing model. Following the procedure explained in Experiment 1, we also computed individual subject classification partitions. The partitions observed with highest frequency were precisely those that were predicted to arise with highest frequency by the GCM (for different patterns of selective attention). The pure conjunctive-rule partition was observed for only 2 of the 60 subjects.
In summary, although subjects had a chance to pursue an extremely simple and seemingly natural rule, our model-based analyses suggest that the inductive learning process in the present free-strategy condition is better characterized in terms of exemplar storage. In view of the highly separable components that were used, we found this result quite surprising.
Recognition
The recognition data in Experiment 3 are not highly diagnostic because the exemplar and rule model predictions tend to be correlated. For example, Stimuli 9, 13, and 14 are least similar to the old training exemplars, but they also come furthest from satisfying the stated rule for Category 1 (see Figure 7) . The probability with which each stimulus was called old in each condition is shown in Table 9 . (The data are averaged over Groups 1 and 2 of the free-strategy condition. The separate data sets were very similar, r = .93.) In all conditions, false-alarm rates were lowest for isolated stimuli 9, 13, and 14, and highest for stimulus 10, which is in close proximity to the high-frequency exemplars in the center of the psychological space. The correlation between the summed similarity measure and old recognition probability was .90 in the partial identification condition and averaged .89 in the free-strategy categorization conditions ( p < .001). The high correlations do not simply reflect a separation between items that are actually new versus old. For new items taken alone, the summed similarity correlations were .87 in the partial-identification condition and averaged .97 in the free-strategy categorization conditions. For old items taken alone, however, the correlations were low and not statistically significant. All aforementioned correlations were quite high in the rule-instructions condition.
The average hit-minus-false-alarm rates in each condition were .527 for partial identification, .302 for free-strategy categorization, and. 184 for rule-instructions categorization. This pattern mirrors the one observed in Experiments 1 and 2. An analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect of conditions, F(2, 87) = 24.4, p < .001. (This analysis did not include the direct replication data obtained in the freestrategy condition.) There was no effect of blocks and no Condition x Blocks interaction (Fs < 1).
General Discussion
Summary
This research was motivated by several recent studies demonstrating the ability of a selective-attention exemplar model to provide precise quantitative accounts of rule-described categorization Nosofsky, 1984 Nosofsky, , 1986 Nosofsky, , 1987 . The purpose of the present study was to test more rigorously the extent to which classification performance using rule-described structures can be interpreted in terms of the principles of exemplar-based generalization. Category structures were designed that contrasted the predictions of the exemplar model and a simple rule model based on the idea of economy of description. Categories were described using an extended version of the set-theoretic logic, and it was hypothesized that people would adopt the category partitions requiring the shortest sequences of logical elements and operators. Theoretical analyses at both the group and individualsubject levels strongly favored the predictions of the exemplar model over the simple rule model using a disjunctive-rule structure in Experiment 1 and a conjunctive-rule structure in Experiment 3. This pattern held true, however, only in conditions in which people learned categories via induction over the training exemplars. For both the disjunctive and conjunctive structures, the rule-model predictions were strongly favored in conditions in which people were given explicit instructions to apply the rules.
Converging evidence about category-learning strategies was obtained by collecting postacquisition old-new recognition data. Overall recognition performance was always better in the free-strategy conditions than in the rule-instructions con- ditions, suggesting that exemplar storage and comparison processes were more prevalent in the former. The structure of the recognition data also supported this interpretation. In free-strategy conditions, probability of old recognition responses was correlated with summed similarity of a probe to the original training exemplars. Marked departures from this pattern were sometimes observed in the rule-instructions conditions, where a codeterminant of recognition judgments appeared to be the extent to which a probe satisfied the stated rule.
Whether there are conditions short of explicit instructions that would promote the use of the simple rules is an interesting question for future research. Even in the present free-strategy conditions, there was evidence that some of the individual subjects adopted simple rules inconsistent with the exemplar model predictions, although it was not a prevalent strategy. Several aspects of the present study probably fostered an exemplar strategy, including the fact that category sizes were small, repetition of individual exemplars was extensive, and transfer tests were immediate. What we have shown is that at least under certain conditions, people's mental representations of rule-described categories appear interpretable in terms of the principles of exemplar-based generalization. The generalizability of the exemplar interpretation to other situations in which rule-described structures are used remains to be seen.
Perhaps the most important contributions of the present work involved the joint collection of complete-identification, partial-identification, categorization, and recognition data using fixed sets of stimuli as well as the attempt to establish theoretical linkages among the paradigms. This research strategy helps in pointing up common mechanisms of memory and attention that may underlie the different forms of classification, and it places rigorous constraints on competing models. Although there remains a good deal of room for improvement, the exemplar approach went a long way toward providing a unified quantitative account of categorization, identification, and recognition performance.
Strategies, Models, and Exemplars
In the theoretical analyses reported in this study, the exemplar and simple rule strategies were represented in terms of different models. In previous work, Medin and Smith (1981) proposed that different strategies could be captured within the framework of a single model, namely the exemplarstorage model (for related ideas, see Medin, 1986) . Rather than assuming that the actual process by which categorization decisions are made varies with different strategies, the idea is that different strategies may lead to modifications in the particular way in which exemplar information is stored. This differential storage is representable in terms of modifications of the similarity parameters (or attention weights) that are part of the model. Medin and Smith provided some support for this view by manipulating classification strategies via instructions. In one condition, for example, subjects were instructed to classify items by using a particular rule-plusexceptions strategy. Although patterns of performance differed considerably as a function of the instructional manipulations, in all cases the classification data were well fitted by the exemplar model, with only its similarity parameters varying.
The results of the present research do not support Medin and Smith's (1981) proposal, indicating instead that alternative classification strategies are indeed sometimes better represented in terms of different models. Several aspects of Medin and Smith's approach and the present one may account for the differing messages. First, although Medin and Smith observed a good fit of the exemplar model to their rule-instructions condition data, they did not compare it with the fit of an explicitly formalized rule-based model. Also, the category structure that they used may simply have been insufficient to yield sharply contrasting predictions for the different strategies. In the present study, of course, our focus was on the development of such contrasts. Finally, it may well be the case that a greater degree of exemplar storage took place in Medin and Smith's rule-instructions condition than in ours. In their study, subjects were told that there was one exemplar in each category that failed to satisfy the main rule, but subjects had to search for and learn these exceptions. By contrast, for the rules that we tested, complete coding of individual exemplars was not a requirement.
Possibly, Medin and Smith's (198 l) proposal may still be tenable if we relax one of the exemplar model's present assumptions. As currently formalized, subjects are assumed to give differential attention to individual dimensions of the items (e.g., a subject might weight the angle dimension more than the size dimension). A more general model would allow for the weighting of individual values along the dimensions (e.g., a subject might give high weight to Value 4 on the angle dimension). Although value-specific forms of selective attention could be posited that would allow the exemplar model to describe the patterns of classification data in our ruleinstructions conditions, at present such an account must be considered post hoc and unprincipled. Preliminary attempts to develop principled versions of the exemplar model that incorporate forms of value-specific and stimulus-specific selective attention are discussed by Medin and Edelson (1988) and Ross, Perkins, and Tenpenny (1988) .
The assumption of value-specific selective attention might also allow the exemplar model to account for the patterns of recognition performance in the rule-instructions conditions. Subjects may have selectively coded the specific dimension values that were stated in the rules and stored these values in memory during classification learning. Summed similarity would then be greatest for those probes that matched the training exemplars on these critical values. Thus, recognition would be related to the extent to which a probe satisfied the stated rule.
Rule Induction and Exemplars
The construct of rule induction is ubiquitous in psychological research and is an intuitively compelling notion. But without introducing constraints, the idea that people learn "rules" is theoretically empty--it makes no predictions and cannot be falsified. From one perspective, our research may be viewed as an exploration of the kinds of rules that people induce when learning classifications. Through continued exploration, we might discover the needed constraints that would give the rule construct added theoretical utility.
What kinds of rules did people induce in learning our classification problems? For the most part, the rules contained more specific information than was necessary to discriminate the categories. This result agrees with Medin et al.'s (1987) and Ashby and Gott's (1988) observations in their recent explorations of classification rule induction. A good summary of the rules that people adopted is simply that they had a great deal in common with the predictions of the selectiveattention exemplar model. A fruitful avenue for future work might involve contrasting the predictions of the selectiveattention exemplar model with models that posit more complex or specific forms of rule induction (e.g., Anderson, 1986; Michalski, 1983 ).
There appears to be a dynamic tension in the formation of people's conceptual representations. On the one hand, there is a drive toward simplicity, generality, and the construction of representations with cognitive economy. On the other hand, overly general representations do not allow people to easily adjust to changed environmental contingencies (Anderson, Kline, & Beasely, 1979; Estes, 1986b) and will often result in suboptimal classification performance (Ashby & Gott, 1988) . These latter considerations point up advantages in the preservation of specific experiences. The selectiveattention exemplar model may represent a compromise, in which specific experiences are stored, but with attention focusing on those aspects of the exemplars that appear most relevant to the categorization. The notions of "selective attention operating on exemplars" and "specific information contained in rules" may be pointing to some common ground. Note. Cell probabilities are based on 420 observations per row of the matrix. Note. Cell probabilities are based on 125 observations per row of the matrix. 
Rationale for Proposed Quantification of the Rule-Based Models
If a subject adopted, for example, the rule C 1: 2' V 3", he or she would classify an item into Category 1 whenever it was judged to have Value 2 on Dimension 1 or Value 3 on Dimension 2. The complete-identification confusion data can be used to estimate the probability of such a judgment. For example, if a subject identified an item as Stimulus 2, then the item was judged to have Value 2 on Dimension 1 and Value 1 on Dimension 2. Thus, to estimate the probability that an item is judged to have either value 2' or value Y', one sums over all complete-identification-response probabilities corresponding to the critical values stated in the rule, namely, P(2' V 3" [Sd = ~ P(RjlSJ),
where ~ is the set of stimuli satisfying 2' V 3". Substituting the expression for P ( 
bjs~j + ~ bks~k"
Because stimuli are now being categorized rather than identified, however, it seems reasonable to replace the identification response bias parameters in Equation B2 with categorization response bias parameters, yielding
P(R, IS~)=b, ~ s~j + (1 -b,) ~ s~k which is precisely the equation used for formalizing the rule-based model. To give the rule model the same flexibility as the exemplar model, the sensitivity and attention weight parameters used for calculating the s~j similarity values are also allowed to vary freely.
Appendix C
Generalized Context Model (GCM) Predictions of Individual Classification Partitions
In this appendix we show that all observed high-frequency classification partitions, except Partition C, are highly likely to arise if the GCM is correct. We do not attempt to find a single set of parameter estimates that simultaneously predicts the probability of each individual classification partition. Parameter estimates are expected to differ across individual subjects. Our aim is to show that the observed individual classification partitions fall naturally out of the general model and to characterize some of the parameter combinations that lead to high probabilities of the partitions.
For simplicity, we set c equal to 1.00 and b~ equal to .50 and allow w~ to vary. For each set of GCM parameter values, we compute the theoretical probability with which each transfer stimulus is classified in Category 1 or Category 2. Given this set of individual theoretical probabilities, it is then straightforward to compute the overall probability that each of the classification partitions will be observed. These overall theoretical probabilities are reported in Table C 1. Inspection of the table reveals that Partitions, A, B, and G arise with high probability if subjects attend selectively to the angle dimension (i.e., relatively high values of w~). Partition E has high probability if subjects attend equally to the component dimensions or attend slightly more to angle than to size, whereas Partition F has high probability if subjects attend more to size than to angle. We also illustrate that Partition D is likely to arise if people attend selectively to angle and also have a bias toward making Category 2 responses (Column D).
(Note that a bias toward responding Category 2 is in the direction of the category base rates. The value of the bias parameter estimated from the pooled categorization data was b~ = .45, and the Partition D subjects may have been responsible for this tendency.) Generally speaking, the table suggests that the overriding tendency was for subjects to attend selectively to the angle dimension. This tendency is reflected in the value of the attention weight estimated from the pooled categorization data, namely w~ = .64. Table C1 also shows that Partition C arises with near zero probability, given these sets of GCM parameter values. We conducted a computer search to find the set of GCM parameters that maximized the probability of Partition C. With c = .57, w~ = .72, and b~ = .43, the predicted probability for Partition C is .025. Because this theoretical probability is a maximum expected estimate (according to the GCM), and it still largely underestimates the observed probability of Partition C, there is evidence that a classification strategy other than the posited exemplar storage and comparison process was operating.
